WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: POLICY ECONOMICS FOR AN ERA OF TRANSITIONS by Shabman, Leonard A.
SOUTHERN  JOURNAL  OF AGRICULTURAL  ECONOMICS  JULY,  1984
WATER  RESOURCES  MANAGEMENT:  POLICY  ECONOMICS  FOR
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Leonard A.  Shabman
Prior to the last decade,  federal water-project  THE  POLICY  PROCESS
construction  programs dominated water policy. 
These programs continue, but at a reduced levels  w  n i  g
incremental  politics within  institutional  guide- of  funding,  and  the  nation  now  is  defining  a  lines  which  are  subject  to  change  with  time.
new agenda of water resources  issues to include  w  e 
The  following  brief description  of this  choice water quality management and water allocation.
Economists  engaged  in  studies  of  water  a  rei  process  is  the basis for defining  the content  of Economists  engaged  in  studies  of  water  re-
sources  policy,  and who  seek  to influence  the  water policy economics  research  and  advising. sources  policy,  and who seek to  influence  the
direction  of policy through  research,  teaching,
and  extension  will  find  these  exciting  times.  The Temporal  Logic  of  the Policy
However,  I  will  argue  that  these  also will  be  Process
frustrating times unless economists become more  In  a stable  decision  environment,  the choice
effective in designing water policy research and  set of alternatives  is limited to those which will
in offering policy advice.  This argument  can be  be incremental adjustments from the status quo.
summarized  as  follows.  Incrementalism  in  decisionmaking  is  dictated
by  informational  and  computational  limits  on
At  present  a great  share  of economists'  time  the  ability to predict  the consequences  of any
is  devoted  to the  "craft"  of policy economics;  action;  the  best  that  can  be  achieved  for  any
that is, to extending the principles derived from  decision  is  a  partial  understanding  of  its  im-
economic  reasoning  to  public  policy  advising  plications.  Therefore,  decisionmaking  can  be
and  to  the  development  and  use  of  empirical  described as  "probing"  based upon trial, error,
methods.  As  a  result,  economists  have  let  the  and feedback as the means of discovering more
discipline  rather  than  the  policy  context  set  about  the  choice  environment  and  conse-
water resources  research agenda. This approach  quences  of particular  actions  (Lindbloom).  As
to problem  definition  has been  justified by ref-  a result,  it is  more accurate  to describe  choice-
erence  to  an  incorrect  model  of  the  public  making as seeking  incremental  movement away
choice process,  which in turn has reduced  the  from problems,  rather  than  striving to  achieve
effectiveness  of water policy advice.  Increasing  some  prespecified  goal  (Wildavsky,  1979).
the effectiveness of water policy economics will  Incremental choice proceeds within the frag-
require  changing  the  way  economists  define  mented  structure  of authority  and political  in-
water policy issues and directing more attention  fluence found in democratic societies. As a result,
to strategies  of policy advising.  These  two  ac-  decisions, even when incremental, do not reflect
tivities are termed the "art"  of policy  econom-  a consensus on the "right thing to do."  Instead,
ics.  decisions arise from a process in which different
partisan  groups decide  to  agree  to  a  choice  in
To illustrate this argument,  I will discuss both  order  to  earn  some  (but  not  complete)  satis-
the  changing  character  of  United  States  water  faction  of their  individual  goals  from  the  de-
management  and the  role  of economists  in  di-  cisions  made  by the  legislative  and  executive
recting  future  changes.  The  interpretation  of  agencies.  (Indeed,  the  legislators  and  bureau-
United States water  policy history  and  the role  crats themselves  are part of this bargaining  pro-
of policy economics  is based upon  a model  of  cess.)  In  the  process,  policies  "...  are better
the  public  policy  process  which  is  described  described  as happening than as decided upon."
in  the  next  section.  (Lindbloom,  p.  523).
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53Incremental  politics appears disorderly.  There  cussed.  First,  the  dominant  ideology  provides
is  no  hierarchical  decision  system  in  which  the basis for the constitutional  rules which  de-
information  is  collected  and  then  interpreted  fine  the  legitimate  scope  of  governmental  ac-
as  it  passes  from  the  bottom  to  the  top  of  a  tivity.  Second,  operating  rules  foster  the
decision  hierarchy.  In  reality,  there  is  no  de-  administration  of legitimized  governmental  au-
cision  point;  instead,  as  Lindbloom  notes,  de-  thority.  Operating  rules  are  the  laws,  organi-
cisions aren't made,  they happen. However,  the  zational forms and informal rules of order which
decision  process  has  its  own  temporal  logic.  govern  how  interest  groups,  legislatures,  ex-
Choices  are made  in response  to  opportunities  ecutive  agencies,  and  the courts relate  to each
and  constraints  understood  to  be  effective  at  other.  Operating rules must direct incremental
the  moment  a  decision  can be  made.  politics  so  that public  decisions  are  consistent
Problems and solutions are  attached  to  with  the dominant  ideology.
choices, and thus to each other, not because  Earlier,  the  argument  was  made  that  incre-
of their inherent connections in a  means-  mental  politics  is  not  goal-directed  but rather
end sense,  but in terms of their temporal  is  "problem  avoiding."  However,  perceptions
proximity.  The  collection of decisionmak-  of  broad  social  goals,  here  termed  ideology,
ers, problems, and solutions that come to  define  the  appropriateness  of  problem  defini-
be associated with a particular  choice  op-  tions and acceptable solutions. It governs public
portunity is  orderly-but the logic  of the  choice  by dictating that certain actions  may be
ordering is temporal rather than hierarchi-  taken  by government  because they are  right,
cal  or  consequential (Marc  . 37).  rather  than  because  particular  groups  receive
special  advantage  from  the  choice  (Kalt  and
The result  is that the definition  of the policy  Zupan).  North  states  the argument  as  follows:
problem  to  be  solved  is  a  function  of timing.  The allocating of resources through the po-
Public  issues  have multiple  dimensions  and  at  litical and judicial process provides ample
any time one dimension of the issue will dictate  opportunity for  ideological conviction  to
the  perception  of  the  problem  (Allison).  For  dominate the decisionmaking process. Re-
example,  pesticide regulation  is a  multifaceted  cent studies have shown that the  best pre-
issue  including  such  factors  as  protection  of  dictor of legislative voting behavior is not
public health and costs to the farm sector. After  any evident interest group but ideological
a  time,  when  a  pesticide  has  been  found  in  conviction as measured by  the Americans
groundwater supplies, the problem will be seen  for Democratic  Action and other rating  sys- .primarily  as one of epublic  safety.  Con-  tems. It  is not that interest group pressures primarily as one of ensuring public safety.  Con-  are not important sources ofpolitical de- sideringthesamebansduring  aperiodare  not important sources of political de-
sidering  the same  ban  during a period  of rapid  cisionmaking; they  are....  It  is rather that
food  price  increases,  without  its  discovery  in  legislators, regulators, and  the  executive
groundwater  supplies,  will  cause  the problem  branch are faced with many choices which
to  be defined  primarily  in terms  of minimizing  allow ideology to be the decisivefactor  where
costs imposed  on agriculture.  The  range  of so-  the costs of ideological  conviction are small
lutions  to  a  problem  which  are  considered  to  or negligible, interest groups are relatively
be  feasible  also  depends  on  timing.  As  one  evenly divided on an issue, or the diffusion
example,  the likelihood of a pesticide ban will  of costs and benefits is so  widespread and
be influenced by who the environmental  agency  individually small that it is not worthwhile nir  o  ,  a  fctr  w  i  age  y  h  for any individual or group to devote sub- administrator  is,  a  factor  which  changes  with  stantil  resourcestointerestgrouppressure. witthecolrcsstantial resources  to interest  grouppressure.
time  and  the electoral  process.1 And finally,  strong ideological conviction
may, andfrequently does, lead  political de-
Institutions  and Incremental Politics  cisionmakers to  make  decisions that run
counter to  organized interest group pres-
The temporal  logic of incremental  politics  is  sures.
directed by an institutional context. Institutions
as  the  "set of rules,  compliance procedures,  But  even mor  important, the composition
and actions of interest groups  themselves and moral and ethical behavioral norms de-  a  pcable in ters  of interestgroup
are not explicable in terms of interest group signed to  constrain the  behavior of individ-  pressure that excludes  ideological convic-
uals..." (North,  p.  201).  For  purposes  of this  tions. It is possible in some cases to identify
discussion  two  specific  aspects  of  institutions,  interest  grouppressures  that mirrorpositive
as  constraints  on  incremental  politics,  are  dis-  net private benefits to  the participants of
I It is  this particular aspect  of actual  choice which  the public  choice  theorists critique.  The  rules governing  incremental
politics  are  found wanting  whenever  the  political  choices  made  do  not serve  the  prespecified  objective  of  efficiency  in
resource  allocation  (Anderson).  This  paper  puts  great  weight  on  political  rationality  as  a  proper  basis  for  incremental
political  choice.  Political  rationality  in  choice  deals  first  with  the  preservation  and  improvement  of the  decisionmaking
structure  (Wildavsky  1968).  Political  rationality  cares  about gaining group acceptance  for solutions to immediate  problems
while  emphasizing  the  need  to maintain  the  capacity  for future  decisionmaking;  political  rationality  cares more  for  how
decisions  can be  made  and  less  for what  particular decisions  should be.
54sufficient magnitude to explain such behav-  of water for depletable  energy and mineral  re-
ior;  but  in  many  it  is  not possible.  The  sources  (Pinchot).  Reflecting  these  concerns,
modern  environmental movement  is  one  President  Theodore  Roosevelt's  Inland  Water-
such case (North, p. 56).  ways Commission  Report of  1908 called for an
expanded  federal  role  in  the  development  of
Much  of the  political  debate  is  about ideol-  the  nation's  water  resources  to  promote  eco-
ogy-issues  of fairness,  the appropriateness  of  nomic development and economic equity. How-
particular  values,  and  the  legitimate  scope  of  ever,  until the  1930's there remained a  public
government.  These  are  analytically  intractable  scepticism  about  the extension  of government
questions,  without  precise  answers,  but  they  programs  into  the  market economy.
are  the  substance  of  politics.  Of  course,  the  It  was  a  series  of  severe  floods  during  the
dominant ideology will change over time. Such  mid-1930's,  coincident  with  the  great  depres-
shifts  in  ideology  can  be  attributed  to  "intel-  sion,  that  moved  the  federal  government  into
lectual entrepreneurs" who espouse and defend  a major water project construction program dur-
contrasting  views  of the  world  and  ultimately  ing the administration of Franklin Roosevelt  (for
are  able  to convince  individuals  and  groups of  discussion of this period see Holmes).  For many
the  merits  of  their  position  (North,  p.  51).  persons,  the  depression  was  evidence  of  the
Ideological  shifts  lead  to institutional  changes  failure  of  the  market  process  to  provide  for
which alter the legitimate  scope of government  equitable  economic  growth.  This  belief  sup-
activity  and  provide  for  new  operating  rules  ported a water project construction program for
which  constrain  subsequent  periods  of  incre-  direct  provision  of  jobs  and  to  provide  flood
mental  politics.2 control,  navigation,  irrigation,  and power pro-
duction  for expanding  the agricultural  and  in-
WATER  MANAGEMENT  ISTITUTI  dustrial  base  of  the  nation.  For  the  next  30
WATER  MANAGEMENT  INSTITUTIONS
WATER  IN  TRANSITION STITUTIONS  years,  there  was  social  consensus  on  the:  (i) iN  TRANSITION legitimacy of public sector  (primarily federal)
The  history  of water  policy  in  this  century  water  project  development  and  (ii)  appropri-
has been  one  of institutional  change.  Two  sig-  ateness  of storage  and  river  control  structures
nificant  periods  were  the  middle  1930's  and  for flood  control,  navigation,  hydropower,  and
the  early  1970's.  At  these  times  institutional  irrigation purposes as contributors  to economic
shifts redefined the appropriate  role  of govern-  prosperity.  The progressive conservation  move-
ment  in  water  resources  management  and  ment's ideological commitment to public water
changed  the operating  rules  governing  agency  development  projects  had  finally been  realized
decisionmaking.  in the formation of a federal water development
program  during  the  "New  Deal"  of  Franklin
Roosevelt.
The  Era  of  Federal Water  Project The  Era of  Federal Water  Project  During  the  New  Deal  period,  an  important
Development  institutional  change  was  the  "New  Deal"  ad-
The later years of the 19th century were char-  ministrative  agency  (Ackerman  and  Hassler).
acterized  by  increasing  concentration  of  eco-  This institutional  adjustment was  an attempt to
nomic  power  in  the  nation's  industrial  promote  the  application  of  science  to  solving
organizations  and  the  final  exploration  of the  the problems  of the nation by isolating  admin-
western  frontier.  Recognition  of  these  forces  istrative  agencies  from  the exercise  of interest
was  the foundation  for the progressive  conser-  group  influence.  Only  by  careful,  unbiased,
vation  movement which espoused two  themes: vation  movement which espoused  two  themes:  evaluation  of technical,  economic,  and  social
(i)  redistributing  the  nations  resource  wealth  facts, would there  be hope for finding the best
by public  action  and  (ii)  increasing  the  tech-  solution to the problems  of modern society.  In
nical  efficiency  of  resource  use  to  offset  an  its  purest  form,  this  ideal  was  realized  in  the
expected decline in the discovery of new sources  formation  of  independent  regulatory  commis-
of natural  wealth.  As  it applied  to water  man-  sions, but the principle  extended to other agen-
agement,  resource  conservation  called  for  the  well.
maximum  development  and  engineering  con-  This "affirmation of expertise"  (Ackerman and
trol of  the  nation's water  resources for  power  Hassler,  p. 4)  was part of a general social trend
production  and  transportation.  Such  develop-  which  in  the  early  part  of this  century,  came
ment, which would occur whenever technically  to see science  as the tool for human betterment
feasible,  was  justified  as  permitting  the substi-  (Hart,  p.  516).  To permit expert  judgement  to
tution of the continuously  renewable  resource  govern agency decisions, the New Deal agency's
2 An alternative  explanation  for institutional  change  is  offered  by public  choice  theory.  In this view structural  changes  in
the  economy  can alter  implicit price  relationships  and  call  forth  adjustments  in resource  allocation.  Institutional  changes
necessary  to  permit this reallocation  are  induced  by  the  opportunity  for efficiency  gains  (Anderson  and  Hill).
55legislative mandate provided only the most gen-  relation  with  the  natural  world  had  the  most
eral  policy direction  (Lowi).  "Instead of im-  widespread  impact on public  thought.  The  in-
posing a hard and fast solution to a complex  tellectual  leadership  for  this  composite  view
and changing  problem, the legislature should  included  such  persons  as  Rachel  Carson,  Paul
invite the agency to organize the expert knowl-  Erlich, Rene Dubos, and Barry Commoner. These
edge required  for intelligent  regulation" (Ack-  people wrote extensively and persuasively dur-
erman and  Hassler, p.  5).  The  courts were only  ing the  1960's  and  1970's,  pointing  out what
to  ensure  that  agency  decisions  were  not  "ar-  they saw as the increasing contamination of the
bitrary  and capricious";  that is,  to ensure  that  natural world and warning of dire consequences
serious consideration was given to relevant data  of people's unrestrained exploitation of natural
and expert  opinion.  The  court  was  not to  sec-  systems  was  not  changed.
ond-guess the agency, substituting its judgement  e  l 
,for  t  agency  expert  .(Shapiro)  One  result  of  the  environmental  arguments for the agency  expert  (Shapiro).
In water  policy  the  creation  ohe  de  was a questioning  of the historical construction In  water  policy,  the  creation  of  the  inde- pendent  Tennessee  Valley Authority (T)  wa  premise of United States water management. The pendent Tennessee  Valley Authority  (TVA)  was nation  had built a  large  capital  stock  of dams a  product  of  the  hope  that  expert  technical  and  ater  delier  sstes  sine  te 
analysis  could  direct the  nation's water  devel-  t  as  te  natin  me  1970's  the but  as  the  nation  moved  into  the  1970's  the opment program. The TVA ideal embodied what concept  of  a  capital  stock  in water  resources had become  the "pure  doctrine"  of river  basin  wr  t  ice
was expanded beyond physical works to include development  (Wengert).  The  doctrine  stressed the remaining  free  flowing  rivers  and  environ- that  there  were  three  components  to  rational  menl amnities associate  d  w  item  om- mental amenities associated with them. Accor- water  management:  a  river basin  focus,  devel-  i  thi  h  that  w panying  this  change  was  the  view  that  water opment of multipurpose water storage projects  r  d  resources  decisions  must  focus  on  using what and promotion of social and  economic change. and  promotion of social and  economic change.  we  have  rather  than on  seeking to  expand the Individual water projects were to be developed supply  of physical  works.  By  the  late  1960's, in  rational  relation  to  river  basin  plans  devel-hysical  works.  By  the  late  1960's, the social consensus supporting the federal water oped by experts.3 Extension of this commitment  development began  to collapse  funding  in real
development began to collapse, funding, in real to the expert public bureau also gave the Corps  e  e  l  e of Engineers,  Bureau  of Reclamation,  and  Soil  terms, for new water development  projects fell, of Engineers,  Bureau  of Reclamation,  and  Soil  and  there  have  been no  funds appropriated  for
and there  have been  no funds appropriated  for Conservation  Service  the  ability to direct  their  b  os  Einee  or new project starts  by the Corps of Engineers  or own  programs,  although  these  agencies  were  Bureau  of Reclamation  since  1976.
not  as  insulated  from  political  interference  as
the  New Deal  regulatory  agencies.  As  a  result,  The ideology of the environmental  movement
for  many  years  the  recommendations  of these  also  provided  a  legitimate  base  for  new  laws
water project construction  agencies were rarely  which  redirected  the  focus  of water resources
questioned,  because  of  the belief  in  Congress  policy and management. For example, the 1972
that  a project planned  by them was  technically  Federal  Water  Pollution  Control  Act  Amend-
sound  and  consistent  with the  social  purposes  ments,  later  reauthorized  as  the  Clean  Water
of the nation's water program  (Shabman,  1972).  Act of  1977, focused  attention of water quality
rather than water development and had a stated
goal of zero discharge of wastes into the nation's
The  Environmental Movement  and the  waters  by  1985,  signaling the  intent to reallo-
New  Environmental  Agency  cate property rights to use of the nation's water
During  the  1960's,  the  dominant  resource  aay  from waste  discharges. 4 Although  econo-
conservation  ideology began to shift away from  mists  have  maligned the zero discharge  goal,  it
the  legacy  of  the  progressive  conservation  was  a  political  symbol  of  the  legislative  ac-
movement.  Building upon the writings of Henry  ceptance  of the new  environmental  ideology.5
Thoreau,  George  Perkins  Marsh  and  the  more  A second  institutional  shift, coinciding  with
recent work of Aldo Leopold, the environmental  the  environmental  movement,  was  a  reassess-
movement  was  grounded  in  the argument  that  ment  of the ideal of the New Deal  agency.  The
people's  manipulation  of nature for solely ma-  attempt  to  give  agencies  maximum  flexibility
terial  gain  was  unethical.  However,  blending  in their legislative mandates, so they could make
this  ethical  argument  with  the  argument  that  decisions  by expert judgment,  was being called
human  survival  depended  upon  a  harmonious  into  question.  The  evidence  was  accumulating
3 The New  Deal  agency  could  find  and  implement  "best"  solutions  to water  management  problems.  In  this intellectual
environment,  planners sought to develop  economic evaluation tools such as  benefit-cost analysis to promote scientific choice
and  it was  from  this base  that  the  development  of benefit-cost  analysis  in  the federal  agencies  proceeded  (Maass,  1970).
However,  in later years  the belief  in the  utility of benefit-cost  analysis  as  a  decision  tool receded  (Shabman, 1984).
4 The  1948 Water  Pollution Control  Act  expanded  federal  involvement in water management  to water quality protection,
but did  not  usurp state authority  for setting water  quality standards  and  regulating waste-water  discharge  (Davies).  Despite
several  subsequent  amendments  to  the Act,  it was not until  1972  that  significant  changes  were  made.
5 The  Act's interim  goal  of  swimmable  and  fishable  waters  is  no less  a  statement  of this ideological  committment.
56that  interest  group  politics  had  often  been  as  tions of Congress  and the  courts  could  ensure
significant in agency decisions  as the application  that no undue influence was exerted by selected
of expertise.  Regulatory  agencies  were  said  to  interest groups on the EPA choice of technology
be  "captured"  by  those  they were  to regulate  and that issues  of science policy were not sub-
subverting  the  broader  purposes  of  their  reg-  merged  as  issues  of technical  analysis.
ulatory  mandate  (Ackerman  and  Hassler).
Spending  decisions  were  said  to  be  made  in  THE PRACTICE  OF WATER  POLICY
response to a pork-barrel politics where an "iron-  ECONOMICS
triangle"  of agency  personnel,  interest  groups
and  congressional  subcommittee  members  set  The  remainder  of this paper draw  upon the
spending  priorities  to  serve  the  interests  they  preceding discussion  to provide  a critical  eval-
represented,  subverting  the desire  to  have  de-  uation  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  current  ap-
cisions  made  to  serve  a rational  plan  of devel-  proach to water policy economics research  and
opment  (Lowi).  Indeed,  as early as the  1950's,  advising. In addition, suggestions are offered for
the federal water project  construction  agencies  increasing  the policy effectiveness  of water  re-
were  used as examples  of the failures  of "pork  source  economists.
barrel"  politics  to  promote  a  rational  pattern
of water  development  projects  (Maass,  1951).  Perspectives  on  Water Policy
However,  support  for  project  development  Economics
agencies remained strong until the 1970's, when
support  for  water  projects  as  an  appropriate  Frequently,  water  policy  economics  is  mis-
water  management alternative  declined.  directed by an inappropriate  model  of the pol-
icy  process.  In  this  model,  governmental
A  second  argument  against  the  ideal  of  the  decisionmaking  is  comprised  of a  rational-an-
New Deal  agency  was  that pure  expertise  was  alytical component and  a political  component.
a  myth.  This  was  especially  true  for  environ-  Decisions proceed in a four step sequence. First,
mental  management  where the questions need-  knowledge  of  all  alternatives  for  action  in  a
ing  answers  often  appeared  scientific,  but  in  particular situation  is established.  Second,  con-
fact  transcended  science  (Ricci  and  Molton).  sequences of alternative actions are determined.
For example, the choice to use epidemiological  Third,  alternatives  are  compared  according  to
versus  animal  test  evidence  for  establishing  the preference  ordering  of the  decisionmaker,
health  risk  of chemicals  is  a  question  of what  or  a  hypothetical  entity  termed  "the  state."
one  author  terms  "science  policy"  (Ashford,  Fourth,  a decision  rule  permits  selection  of a
Ryan and Caldart).  Likewise,  weighting of health  single  alternative  from  among the  choice  set.
risks  versus  costs  of  a  chemical  ban  is  not  a  e  tat  decision  rule  is  embodied  in  the The state's  decision  rule is embodied  in the
simple matter of scientific calculation  (Crandall  concept  of  the  social  welfare  function  which
and Lave).  In making science  policy,  there was  includes  arguments  such  as  economic  effi-
reason  to provide  for political  and judicial  ov-  ciency,  equity, and environmental  quality (Stei-
ersight  on the exercise  of agency  decisions.  ner).  The  importance  of  the  various  welfare
This shift in viewpoint  about the role  of ex-  arguments is established by a "diffuse"  political
pertise  in public  policy affected  the writers of  process.  As  seen  in this model,  the role  of the
the environmental  legislation of the  1970's.  In  policy  economist  is  to  conduct a  separate  ob-
much  of  the  new  environmental  legislation,  jective analysis that provides  "informational  in-
Congress,  not  the  agency,  set  the  goals,  set  puts" (Randall, p. 90) on the impact of particular
timetables  for goal  achievement,  and  directed  alternatives  on  the  various  arguments  in  the
that the goals  be attained by the application of  state's welfare  function.  However,  because  no
particular  technologies  (Ackerman  and  Has-  particular  welfare  argument  would  dominate
sler).  In  the  Federal  Water  Pollution  Control  another,  the preferred  alternative,  in  terms  of
Act  Amendments  of  1972,  industrial  and  mu-  any one  argument,  may not be  chosen.  For ex-
nicipal waste dischargers were required to have  ample,  a benefit-cost analyst  might explain de-
increasingly  sophisticated  pollution  control  cisions  which  do  not  confor  /  to  the
equipment  at  specified  future  dates.  At  each  economically efficient choice by suggesting there
time the required technology would be,  in EPA's  was  a  predominance  of other  goals  over  eco-
judgment,  the  "state-of-the-art"  in  pollution  nomic  efficiency.
control, subject to a determination that the tech-  Adherence  to this  choice model,  as at least a
nology  was  "economically  achievable"  (Free-  normative  ideal  if  not  descriptive  of  reality,
man,  1980).  However,  Congress  and the courts  permits  economists  to  define  policy  research
(through legislative provision for citizen suits)  problems  in terms of a hypothesized  economic
were  expected  to analyze  EPA  decisions  and if  efficiency  objective,  with studies drawing upon
necessary,  substitute  their  judgement,  after  the  theoretical  foundation  and  empirical  ap-
hearing  from  expert  witnesses,  for  that  of the  plications  of  neo-classical  welfare  economics.
agency.  With  this  operating  rule,  oversight  ac-  The  policy  advice  to  be  derived  from  these
57analyses  can  be  easily  incorporated  into  the  constrained by institutions and by the influence
choice model previously  described.  As  a result,  of contending  groups  in  the  political  process.
the  policy-economics  literature  abounds  with  However,  institutional  constraints  are  not  pre-
sophisticated  methods  of  valuing  non-market  cisely defined and are subject to change.  In this
goods  in  order  to  provide  for  more  complete  decision  process,  incremental  choices  are  the
benefit-cost  analyses  (Freeman,  1979);  with  basis  for  discovering  the  changing  nature  of
proposals  for  innovative  approaches  to  mar-  problems and acceptable  solutions. Discovering
ginal-cost  pricing  publically  provided  goods;  boundaries and effectiveness  of possible actions
with  demonstrations  of the potential  efficiency  depends upon experimentation--trial  and  error.
gains from substituting market and quasi-market  It  is  here  that analysis  fits.  "The  trouble  with
allocation  of  resources  for  allocation  by  gov-  learning  by  experience  is  that  one  needs  so
ernmental  administration  (Anderson).  much  of  it.  The  attraction  of  analysis  is  that
The  reality is  that most of this policy advice  one  need  not  live  through  everything"  (Wil-
falls  on  deaf  ears  (Cochrane).  Adhering  to  a  davsky,  1979,  p.  125).  Policy analysis  is a type
choice  model where  analysis  is  separate  from  of intellectual experiment.  It expands the range
politics can be a cause of frustration. Disdaining  of choices  to be considered,  as deviations  from
participation  in  politics,  economists  are  often  the existing situation, beyond those which might
left to defend the wisdom of analytically derived  be  explored if each choice  had to  be tested by
solutions to their own definition  of policy prob-  actually  taking political  action.
lems,  arguing that theirs  is  the voice  of reason  With  this  perspective,  the  policy  economist
among  partisan  interests.  must acknowledge  that policy economics  is the
In  fact,  there  are  ideological  strands  to  po-  provision of advisory support to participants  in
litical  debate:  what  is  a  "fair"  distribution  of  the policy process and  will, therefore,  become
resources,  what should be  the dominant values  client-oriented.  Even  if  no  client  is  specified
of a  society,  and what  are  the legitimate  roles  prior  to  an  analytical  study,  the  effect  of that
of  government  in  distributing  resources  and  study on  decisions  will  still  depend  upon  its
shaping values.  However,  when  economists  let  use by some partisan interest in support of their
problems  for policy  analysis  be  solely  defined  own position. Alternatively, the economist might
by economic  efficiency principles,  they implic-  conduct  an  analysis  and  then  seek  to  find  a
itly seek  "...to  effect  what can only be called  partisan who  is  in agreement  with the  conclu-
a revolution in the topicsforpolitical  debate"  sions and recommendations  of the study. In this
(Kelman,  p.  153).  Such  analyses  describe  de-  sense, policy  economics  begins with  the "art"
sirable  (e.g.  efficient)  policy changes  by ignor-  of "creating"  (to use Wildavsky's,  1979, terms)
ing  the  political  processes'  primary  concern  clients for economic analyses.  (The art of policy
with  equity  and  value  questions.  Equity  con-  economics  is  discussed  in  the  next section.)
siderations  in  economics  which are  limited  to
proposals  for lump-sum  cash  transfers  and  re-  By  contrast,  the  craft  of  water  policy  eco-
distributive  choices  are  embodied  in  a  black-  mics is the application of both the deductive
box called  the  state's welfare  function.  Adher-  logic  of economics  and  the empirical  tools  of
ence  to the principle  of consumer  sovereignty  the  discipline  to  developing  economic  infor-
requires that economic analyses accept existing  mation for use in water policy analysis  (oads;
preference  structures  rather  than  entering  the  Wildavsky,  1979).  If  analysis  is  viewed  as  a
continuous ideological  debate  over which pref-  substitute for learning by explicit decisionmak-
erences are appropriate and how particular pref-  ing,  the  policy  economist  can  offer  assistance
erences  should  be  advanced  by  government  in  the  conduct  of  policy  experiments  by  the
action.  application of the tools of a positive economics
based upon development  of behavioral  models
Thus,  at  first  it  may appear  that economists'  fafiable  hypotheses.  Demon-
disciplinary orientation is ill-suited to the issues  tsrations  of the  empirical  relationships  amon strations  of the  empirical  relationships  among
of concern  in policy.  However,  there  is  an ap-  economic  variables  can  offer  the  client  of the
proach  to policy  economics  and  advising  that  policy economist insights which only might be
can  raise  the  demand  for  economics  research gained  by  trial  and  error  choicemaking.  Like-
and  advice,  and  in  my  judgment,  can  make  a  of  operations  research  can  be
contribution  to  the  operation  of  the  public  t  o  enes  aern used  to  evaluate  consequences  of  alternative
choice  process.  This  approach  begins  by  re-  actions.
cognizing  the  incremental  nature  of choice  in
the  public  sector.  Decisionmakers  (interest  Policy  economists  can  also provide  advisory
groups  and  government  units)  are  "probing"  support  for the participants  in the incremental
to discover  more  about  the appropriateness  of  decision  process  by  making  the  deductive  ar-
problems  they  might  address  and  possible  so-  guments that can be  drawn from three key prin-
lutions  to  these  problems,  where  the  sets  of  ciples  of  economics;  opportunity  cost,
appropriate problems and possible solutions are  marginalism,  and  incentives.  However,  as will
58be noted later, these arguments will not be free  argument  will  be  illustrated  by review  of  the
of ideological  overtones.  current  water  policy  debate  over  cost-sharing
The principle that any choice will impose an  rules  for federal  water  resource  development.
opportunity  cost,  as  the  value  of  a  foregone  Traditionally,  only a  small  share  of the  cost
alternative,  is  often  ignored in a political  proc-  of federal  water projects  was  borne by project
ess  where  ideological  debate  is  about  which  beneficiaries.  This  low  cost-share  burden,  as  a
values  are most appropriate  and how these val-  program  operating  rule,  ensured  that  the  ide-
ues can be advanced without regard to foregone  ological  commitment  to  water  development,
opportunities.  Therefore,  the  economist's  articulated  in  the  1930's,  would  be  realized.
professional  sensitivity  to  the  argument  that  Thus,  full  repayment  for  irrigation  water  was
there is "no free lunch" is a unique contribution  continuously  modified  as  an  operating  rule  in
in that process.6 The marginalist perspective  of  reclamation  projects because  it conflicted  with
economics  is  also  a  unique  perspective  in  the  the ability to develop western agriculture  (Bur-
policy process.  Confusion between marginal and  ness,  et  al.).  The  Flood  Control  Acts  of  the
total  net  gains  is  frequent  in  an  incremental  1930's and 1940's continuously modified local
decision  process  which  looks  to  the  past  as  a  cost-sharing  requirements  so  that construction
guide  to the future.  For example,  the past  suc-  of  flood  control  works  would  not  be  delayed
cess  of a  program  is  likely  to  be  cited  as  jus-  (Holmes).  This ideological  commitment to  de-
tification for its expansion. The policy economist  velopment has waned, and the cost sharing issue
is  inclined to point out that past  gains  are  not  has become  an especially visible  one  since the
sufficient justification  for successive positive in-  early  1970s  (National  Water Commission).
crements to  a program.  Finally,  in  a real sense,  Noting the interest in cost-sharing reform, the
the  product  of the  political  process  is  the  in-  water  policy  economist  might  conceptualize
stitutions which will direct individuals'  behav-  policy  research  and  advice  as  a  marginal  cost
ior.  Behavioral  changes  can  be  obtained  by  pricing  problem  and  prescribe  optimal  (e.g.
appeals  to morality,  by treats of sanction  or by  efficient)  cost-sharing rules.  In fact,  in the early
incentives  (Shultze).  It is  the policy economist  1970's  a  good  deal  of  the  research  on  cost-
who proposes  institutions which rely upon  in-  sharing was designed  in this manner (Marshall,
centives  for  modifying  peoples  choicemaking  Hanke and Davis). If policy economics  is treated
behavior.  as  a  provision  of  informational  inputs  on  the
economic efficiency argument  in the states wel-
The  Art of  Water  Policy  Economics  fare  function,  then such  marginal  cost pricing
studies  will  be  justified.  However,  it  is  now The  subsequent  discussion  will focus on the  studies  will  be  justified.  However,  it  is  now
art  of  policy  economics  which  includes  two  obvious that the debate  on cost-sharing  contin-
activities:  (i)  specifying the aspects  of the pol-  ues,  and  t  is  also  clear  that  these  economic
icy  problem  which  can  be  addressed  by  the  studies  have  had limited  influence  on that  de-
bate. Economists would increase  their  chances analytic tools of economics  and (ii)  developing  ate  conomt  would  increase  their chances
a  political  strategy  of policy  advising.  In both  to make  a  effectie  poiey
cases,  the  challenge  is  to  create  clients  who  specified what makes water project cost-sharing cases,  the  challenge  is  to  create  clients  who  p  l
will  be  receptive  to  economic  arguments  and  a  policy problem.
analyses.  (See  Meltsner  for  an  excellent  dis-  Cost-sharing  for  water  projects  is  a  budget
cussion of the relationship  of policy analysts to  problem  and  a fairness problem;  cost-sharing
csinothreainhpopolicy  clients.)  t  levels are  a balance  of these two concerns.  The
budget  problem  is  one  of distributing  limited
Specifying  the  Policy  Problem  federal financial resources among multiple pro- Specifying  the Policy  Problem grams.  As a budget problem,  federal  cost-shares
The existing institutional setting, and the his-  are  set  in  relation  to the  perceived  social  im-
tory of an issue  as a  matter  of public  concern,  portance of expenditures on water development
give  any policy  issue  multiple  dimensions.  Ef-  relative to competing programs. Thus, the budget
fectiveness of the policy economist is enhanced  debate over the appropriate level of cost-sharing
if these multiple  dimensions  are clearly under-  is an ideological debate over the legitimate roles
stood  so  that  the  conduct  of  policy  research  of government  in water development.  The level
and provision of advice address the dimensions  of cost-sharing which is "correct"  is conditional
of the problem  relevant  to policy debate.  This  upon resolution  of this issue,  and  not whether
6  Opportunity cost  is  one of the more  elusive concepts  in economics.The  impossibility of empirical  money-measurement
of opportunity  cost,  which  is  ultimately  a  subjective  value  of individual  choicemakers  and  is  dependent upon  the  choice
situation,  is  accepted  here.  However,  as  an  organizing  principle  for policy advice,  opportunity  cost  is  an essential  tool  of
the economist.  Admittedly partial measurement  of foregone opportunities  in money and  non-money terms  is also considered
to  be  both  practical  and  useful.  For  purposes  of this  paper,  benefit-cost  analysis  can be  treated  as  an empirical  extension
of the opportunity cost principle  (Buchanan).  However,  the utility of empirical benefit measurement in the decision  process
is questionable  (Wildavsky,  1979,  pp.  155-181).
59water project beneficiaries will pay the marginal  Creating the  Policy  Problem
cost  of providing  them  with  a  service.  There-
fore,  in  the current  institutional  environment,  Policy  issues  have  many  dimensions.  How-
it  is  certain  that the  appropriate  water project  ever,  at  any time,  one particular  dimension  of
cost-share  rate will be that rate which  discour-  the issue dominates how it is defined as a policy
ages what is now considered inappropriate  fed-  problem  and  dictates  the  range  of acceptable
eral expenditures for water project development.  solutions.  This  dominant dimension  of a prob-
There will not be much economic  analyses  can  lem  can be  called  the "face"  of the  issue  (Al-
contribute  without entering  the  public debate  lison,  p.  168).  A  second  aspect  of the  art  of
over the  legitimate  role  of government  in  this  policy economics  is  ensuring that research and
activity.  advice  are  always  addressing  the  face  of  each
However,  existing  projects  will  continue  to  issue. For the economist,  one strategy of policy
have operation  and  maintenance  expenses  and  analysis would be  to wait to  offer  advice  until
some  distribution  of this  cost burden  must  be  that  time  when  the  face  of  an  issue  changes
"fairly"  made.  As  a  fairness  problem,  water  and  economic  information  will  be  utilized.  A
project  cost-sharing  policy  has  been  closely  more effective approach  is to develop strategies
linked  to  ideas  of capacity-to-pay.  In  the past,  of argument to increase receptivity to the avail-
the commitment  to water project  development  able  economic  information.  Here,  the  art  of
would  not  have  been  served  by  asking  non-  policy  economics  requires  active  engagement
federal  interests  to  pay  more  than  was  afford-  in political  debate,  seeking  to change  the face
able,  because to do so would have been at cross  of the  issue.
purposes with  program  success. Yet,  there  has
existed a belief that non-federal interests should  The  Necessity  of  Political  Economics
pay as much  as they are  "able-to-pay"-an  im-
precise,  but largely agreed  to, principle  of po-  Economists  may  be  reluctant  to  engage  in
litical  negotiation  over cost-sharing  policy,  ideological political  debate. However,  the real-
Understanding  this fairness dimension  of the  ity  is  that  the  tools  of policy  economics  will
policy  debate  would  direct  policy  economics  involve  their  user  in such  debate,  even  if un-
research toward economic impact studies, which  willingly.  The  impossibility  of  ideologically
review the incidence  of alternative cost-sharing  neutral  water  policy  economics  will  be  illus-
rules  in  terms  of  who  would  pay,  not who  trated  by a  discussion  of  how two  basic  argu-
should pay. Such studies would be well received  ments of economics-opportunity  cost and the
and could  direct the political  debate toward  a  desirability of economic incentives-would be
consensus on the fairness  of a cost-sharing  pol-  used and considered  in debates  over reform  of
icy.  Indeed,  as  one recent  example,  economic  water pollution  law.
impact studies  isolated the effect on agriculture  i Water pollution  law has been  under  review of full  recovery of navigation  system operation  for  the  last several  years  as  part  of the  multi-
and  maintenance  costs  (Congressional  Budget  f  i  o  "  O 
Office).  These  studies  demonstrated  that  the  me  n  of te  regulatory  reform."  One  is 
agricultural  sector would have  a significant cost  c  to  reiew  n  e  the  eisl  e  co
burden shifted to it, and this result was deemed  to  eie  n  e  t  legislative  com-
unfair  given  the  economic  difficulties  of  the  mitment  to the  ideological goals  of the  1970's
farm sector. These analyses are helping to direct  environmental  movement.  An  example  of such
the search for  a consensus  on cost share  levels  a  goal  the zero  discharge  goal  of the  Clean
for  navigation  projects7  Water  Act, which  is  a  symbolic  statement  of a
More  generally,  the  models,  methods,  and  commitment to advance water quality improve-
data of the policy economist should be directed  ment  to technically  attainable  levels,  without
to address  a  dimension  of a  problem  which  is  regard  to  costs and benefits  of doing  so.
relevant  to political  debate.  The  assessment  of  Economists  have  become  engaged  in the  re-
the policy problem  to ensure this result  is  the  view of such environmental  goals by their sup-
first  aspect  of  "art"  of  policy  economics.  If  port  for  more  precise  application  of  benefit-
policy  economics  research  proceeds  in  this  cost  techniques  to  environmental  regulation,
manner,  there will  be  an  improvement  in  the  using  modern  methods  of  non-market  goods
productivity of economists, where  the product  valuation.  While  many  economists  express  a
of their work  is facilitating  the policy process.  professional  scepticism  about  the  validity  of
Cost-sharing  for  soil  erosion  control,  which  began  in  the  1930's,  illustrates  a  possible  conflict  between  budget  and
fairness  criteria. Expenditures  to assist farmers in soil erosion control have been partially justified by a belief that maintenance
of the  nation's agricultural  land base  is  a legitimate  purpose  of government  and that soil erosion  threatens the productivity
of the  land base.  At  the  same  time,  the  operating rules  for soil  erosion  control  cost-sharing were  administered  to  provide
equality of access of funds.  However,  this fairness  standard reduced the effectiveness of erosion control expenditures because
funds were  not distributed to  the most erosion prone  soils.  As  a result,  there  is now interest in targeting  funds to areas  and
lands with  highest erosion  rates  (Batie).  Thus,  economic  research  on cost-effective  targeting approaches  is  now in demand.
60these  methods  and  would  not  support  their  are  said  to  be  "technology  based"  (Freeman,
expanded  use,  I  suspect  that  most  economists  1980).  Reform  would  permit  reallocation  of
would at least support introducing the principle  waste treatment requirements from sources with
of opportunity  cost  into  the policy  debate,  re-  high marginal treatment costs to those with low
minding  participants  that ever  higher  environ-  marginal  treatment  costs  providing  for  reduc-
mental quality comes  at  a cost;  that is, there  is  tions in  aggregate  costs  with  no change  in  ag-
no  "free  lunch."  gregate  waste  treatment  levels.
Typically,  the  policy  economist  imagines  To  accomplish this  reform,  economists  have
himself or herself in the role of objective analyst  suggested taxes on waste discharge or pollution-
of  opportunity  costs,  helping balance  the  ex-  rights  markets  as  economic  incentive  systems
cesses of environmental protection against other  which would  secure  any pre-specified  level of
social  priorities.  It  is  useful  to  hear  from  the  water  quality  at  minimum  waste-water  treat-
other side on this point. Leon  Billings, who was  ment cost.  Since  1964,  the profession  has been
in  a  key  policy  position  (Democratic  staff  di-  refining the argument that economic  incentive
rector  of  the  Senate  Environment  and  Public  systems can promote cost-minimizing pollution
Works Committee) when the current water pol-  control strategies  (Kneese).  It has become  the
lution legislation was written,  has little respect  standard  fare  in undergraduate  environmental
for economists'  objectivity.  economics  courses.
Recently,  there  has been  some acceptance  of
In  a brief interview, Billings began by stat-  economic incentive  strategies in EPA's air qual-
ing that "there is a  basic philosophical dif  ity management  program and  some  states have
ference  between  regulatory people  and  experimented  with water pollution rights mar-
economists. Economists don't care whether  kets  (Joeres  and  David).  However,  the  reality
you achieve a reduction of pollution. They  is that economists'  arguments for increasing the
don't really care, but we  really do  care...  use  of  economic  incentives  in  environmental .^^  i.  ^  ^'^  ^^  ^use  of  economic  incentives  in  environmental Billings... used the question asked to express
distaste  for economists, whom  he regarded  management  have  been  rarely  heeded.  This  is
as "zealots" (Kelman, pp.  102-103).  an  apparently  curious  result  because  the  eco-
nomic  incentive  schemes  would  seem  to  be
Economists have  too often been surprised by  ideologically neutral proposals for institutional
being labeled  "zealots,"  because of a failure to  change;  that is,  given a water quality standard,
appreciate  the  nature  of  public  policy.  In  a  the  economist  can  design  an  institution  that
political  context,  the  statement  of a  zero  dis-  will achieve  that  standard at least  cost.
charge  goal  was  a  reflection  of  the  ability of  However,  in the context of the emergent ide-
the environmental  movement to impose  its ide-  ology of the  environmental  movement,  charge
ological  stamp  upon  the  policy  process  and  and  rights  proposals  are  not  perceived  as  ide-
direct  subsequent  incremental  pollution  con-  ologically  neutral.  The  environmental  move-
trol  decisions.  Opportunity  cost arguments  of  ment,  and  the  laws  it spawned,  attempt  to  do
the policy economist  are  an attack  on that ide-  more  than  control  pollution.  They are  part  of
ological  position.  The  argument  is ammunition  a larger effort to redefine  the values  our society
for the political  battle over  values.  holds about  its  natural  environment.  The  eco-
A second  dimension  of the regulatory reform  nomic  analyst  only cares  about how economic
issue  is  the argument  that the regulatory  strat-  incentives  can  influence  people  to  alter  pol-
egies  of  the  1970's  environmental  legislation  luting behavior, without regard to the particular
result  in attaining  environmental  improvement  values  they  hold  about  the  importance  of  en-
at higher than necessary cost.  For example,  the  vironmental  protection.  The  environmentalist
Clean Water Act  requires  EPA  to specify  waste  challenges  and  seeks  to  redirect  those  values
water  standards  based  upon  the  adoption  of  through the regulatory structure. Therefore, one
uniform waste-treatment  technology for classes  objection  to the use  of economic  incentives  is
of industries,  without  regard  to  inter-firm  dif-  that  they  condone  polluting  behavior  by  per-
ferences  in waste  treatment  costs  and to differ-  mitting  pollution  if a  person  is  willing  to pay
ences  in  the  natural  assimilative  capacity  of  for the right to pollute.8 Kelman  describes this
waste  receiving waters. Water quality standards  attitude  as follows:
8As  another  illustration,  the  environmental  movement  promotes  the  principle  of water  demand  reduction  under  the
rhetorical  label of water conservation.  For economists,  water demand reduction is a  pricing problem with the purpose being
an increase  in the efficiency  of resource  allocation.  However,  for the  environmentalist,  there  is more  at stake  in promoting
water  conservation.  According  to  Powledge,  "Conservation  saves water, money and energy, of course, but it also serves
another  very  important function: it cultivates an awareness of water. Once you make the decision to stop letting the
water run while you brush your teeth for example,  using only what you  really need, you think more readily about
water and the larger issues-acid  rain; the health of rivers,  lakes and oceans; government action and inaction; and
the obligation of agribusiness to the land. In effect,  you begin thinking about water and its innumerable connections,
not only  to our transitory comforts,  but to everything else in the world. And this is as it should be, for water is the
stuff of everything that lives and can live upon our planet."
61If a  society uses economic incentives in  en-  water project  development  programs.  For years
vironmentalpolicy, it fails to make a state-  prior  to 1970,  economists  had  been critical  of
mentstigmatizingpolluting  behavior.  If one  the  water  development  programs.  These  criti- believes that  people may justifiably wish the  w  p 
societies they live  in on occasion to  make  cisms  were  based  upon  critical  analysis  sug-
approbatory  or stigmatory statements about  gestng  that  new  water projects  would  not,  as
certain behaviors, and if  one further be-  hoped in the  1930's,  promote  national  and  re-
lieves thatpolluting  behavior should be stig-  gional economic development  (Eckstein,  Have-
matized, then one has reason  to be concerned  man,  and  McKean).  However,  prior  to  the
with using economic incentives in environ-  1970's, the commitment to these programs was
mental policy (Kelman, p.  23).  strong and the economists'  arguments  had little
influence  on water policy. With the  1970's, the A second concern of the environmental move-  influence on water policy. With the  1970's,  the
m  econconceno  enron  al m  anti  wtat e  conomict  leadership  of  the  environ-
ment is  tat  eonoi  incente propo  i  mental movement discovered that economic  ar- unintentionally  reduce  the  ability  of  direct unntntonl  guments could be marshalled in support of their congressional and court oversight to ensure that  o 
the goal  of clean  water  is  vigorously  pursued.  position  and water  resource  economists  began The  regulatory  structure of the Clean Water Act  to  get  a  hearing.  In  this  case,  the  face  of  the The regulatory struct  issue  turned to  providthe  Water Actsis
water  project  issue  turned  to  provide  a  basis requires EPA  selection of both waste treatment  for  acceptance  of economic  arguments  (Shab-
levels  and methods  for waste producing  firms.  man  e  c  as 
Technology  based  standards  are  thought  to  be  man,  1  8).
easy  to  set  and  monitor  by  Congress  and  the  Te contast  in  te  eceon  gi  to  the
courts,  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of  EPA  cap-  arguments of water policy economists illustrates courts,  to reduce  the  likelihood  of  EPA  "cap-
ture"  by polluters  and  to reduce  EPA's  discre-  how the demand for policy economics  is influ- ture"  by polluters  and  to  reduce  EPA's  discre-  e  b  t  i enced  by the  institutional  context  of political tion in setting "science  policy" without outside  e  istuona  ott  o  oit
review  (Ackerman  and  Hassler).  In  contrast,  decisionmaking.  If  economists  wish  to  affect decisions  in  areas  where  their arguments  have economic  incentive  systems  would  place  de-ons  in  areas where their arguments  have economic  incentive  systems  would  place  de-  not  had  influence,  such  as  water  quality  man- cisions  on  the  level  and means  of waste  treat-  not had  inuene,  such  as  water  quality man-
ment  the  d  en  e waste  re  agement, they will need to pay more  attention must  decide  whether  to  the tx  or  to the political  strategy (to use  Kelman's term) who  must  decide  whether  to  pay  the  tax  (or  of policy  economics.
purchase the discharge right) or treat their waste. 
Economists might argue  that such flexibility  in  o  ce is that a pitical strategy choice  is the  key to  cost-effectiveness  in pel-  for policy economics- will vary with the specific choice  is  the  key  to  cost-effectiveness  in  pol-  historical  background  and current institutional
lution  control.  However,  the  memory  of how  historical  background  and current institutional
lthe  unsupervised  New  Deal  agency  owas  c-  setting  for an issue.  However,  the general  out-
the  unsupervised  New  Deal  agency  was  cap-  line  of a political strategy for policy economics tured by those  it was to regulate  must be  over-  o can be  illustrated  by examples  from  the  issues come before the economic  incentive  argument  can be illustrated  by examples  from  the issues will bef  accepted,  eooiinetvaruof  water quality  law reform.9 First,  there  must
be an acknowledgment of the ideological nature
A  Political  Strategy  for  Policy  of policy economics.'0 For example,  the policy
Economics  economist  often  argues  that  effluent  taxes  are
payments  for  the  right  to  discharge  waste.  A
For  the  last  decade,  water  policy  has  been  more  effective  political  argument  (e.g.  not
dominated  by  the  environmental  movement's  threatening  to  the  environmental  ideology)
ideology. Operating rules for water quality man-  would  be  that such  taxes  are penalties  for not
agement  have  been  designed  to  promote  this  stopping pollution. Indeed,  our use  of the term
perspective. At the same time, the tools of water  pollution "right"  or pollution "permits"  is the
resources  economics  have  brought  economists  source  of much  of the  political  opposition  to
into conflict  with  the  new  environmental  ide-  the proposals.  Words reflect values  and a better
ology.  In  short,  the  face  of  the  water  quality  term  is needed.
issue  has not been  conducive  to acceptance  of  Second,  policy  economists  need  to  develop
water  policy economists'  arguments.  arguments  which  change  the  face  of issues  so
Although there was limited acceptance of eco-  they are amenable  to economic  argument.  It  is
nomics  in  reform  of  water  quality  law,  there  in  this  sense  that the  art of  policy  economics
was  a  demand  for  economists  by agencies  and  is  "creating"  the  problem  to  be  solved.  For
groups who wished to dismantle the traditional  example,  receptivity  to  arguments  for  use  of
9 Foster provides an excellent discussion of these general points for the specific  case of the adoption of economic  incentives
in air  pollution  regulation.
10  This  usually  is  recognized  by practitioners  of benefit-cost  analysis,  although  there  remain  arguments  that  benefit-cost
analysis can  be  value-free  (Mishan).  This value-free  benefit-cost  ideal  is  developed from the  social  welfare  function model
of choicemaking  where  economists  are  said  only  to  provide  economic  efficiency  information  for  the  choice  process.  As
already noted, the reality is that benefit-cost analysis and opportunity  cost arguments are used to support ideological positions
(e.g.  stopping water development)  or are  viewed  as  attacks  on  ideological  positions  (e.g.  the zero  discharge  goal).
62economic incentives in pollution control would  CONCLUSION
increase,  if cost-effectiveness  became  the  dom- The  issues on the water policy agenda during inant concern in the policy process. Thus, econ-
' . •the  next  several  years  are  far  more  numerous omists might effectively  lobby environmentalists  t  n 
than  those  discussed  in  this  paper.  Examples to  adopt this  concern  for cost-effectiveness  by  . .,  include  reforming states'  water allocation  law, arguing that environmental  protection goals will 
.^  .^~  .^~  uexpanding  water quality management programs be weakened  in the political  process over time  e  w 
to  control  of  non-point  source  pollution,  and
unless  lower cost regulatory  structures  are put 
in*  pla  ce.  •  t  th*  m*  tfinancing  local government investments in water in  place.  In this manner,  the policy  economist in place.  In this  manner, the policy economist  and sewer  infrastructure.  These issues, and oth-
becomes the ally of the environmentalist, while  ers  like  them,  will be  studied  by  economists,
at the same  time creating  a receptive  environ- but the usefulness  of these studies in the policy
ment  for the, economic  incentive  argument. ment  fprocess  will  depend  upon  economists  being
As  another  lobbying  approach,  the  policy  more  attentive  to the  "art"  of policy  analysis.
economist might argue that the rigid regulatory  The  only natural political constituency for eco-
strategy  we  now  have  for  the  highly  technical  nomic arguments is other economists.  With this
problem  of pollution  control,  with  its  intense  base  of  support,  we  are  unlikely  to  redirect
congressional  and court review, will overwhelm  water resource  institutions  we must  create the
the  information  and  oversight  capacity  of  the  receptive  environment for economic argument.
regulatory agency,  the Congress and the courts.  However,  some  economists'  comparative  ad-
This  will  ultimately  compromise  the  goals  of  vantage,  and  personal  interest,  will  not  lie  in
clean  water  by causing  lengthy  delays  in  goal  problem  specification  and problem creation-
attainment.  Economists  could  argue  that  that  eco-  e  art  of  policy  economics.  Many,  I  suspect
nomic  incentives  based  regulatory  strategy  most  economists,  will  prefer  to  practice  the
would expedite  the  attainment  of goals  by re-  craft  of  policy  economics-including  devel-
ducing the need for detailed review of pollution  opment of models and data.  At  this time,  both
control technology;  that regulators should care  graduate  training  and professional  reward  sys-
only for the goals  of clean water and not about  tems emphasize the craft aspects of policy eco-
the  means  of  pollution  control  used  to  attain  nomics. More attention to the art of water policy
the  goals.  economics  is needed.  While  the talented  "eco-
Note  that  a  political  strategy  for  the  policy  nomic artists" cannot come from graduate train-
economist  (i)  requires a  precise  knowledge  of  ing alone, broadening  the curriculum of students
the historical  pattern which produced  the  cur-  to include  history,  political  science,  and other
rent institutions, and (ii) does not directly stress  disciplines  will  be  an  indispensable  first  step
the "superiority"  of the economists  viewpoint,  in expanding  economists'  capacity  to improve
Also, recognize  that the success  of the lobbying  water policy research,  teaching, and'extension.
effort  is  not  guaranteed  (Crandall).  The  key  Equally important will  be a  free  flow  of econ-
point  is  that  failure  to  redefine  issue  so  that  omists  between  positions  in  government  and
receptivity  to economic  arguments  will  be  in-  the universities to permit academic economists
creased,  inevitably  will  reduce  the  effect  on  to practice  policy economics.  In the final analy-
policy  of the  most  carefully  crafted  economic  sis, the art of policy economics can be learned,
analyses.  but it cannot  be  taught.
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